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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.

:

HEATHER CLOWARD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 200905072-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Aggravated
Exploitation of Prostitution, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1306 (2008), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Ann Boyden, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I: Whether there was sufficient evidence from which to sustain a conviction for
Aggravated Exploitation of Prostitution where the State failed to present evidence that
Cloward purposely caused Wood to engage in prostitution and failed to present evidence
that Cloward had knowledge that Wood was underage.
Standard of Review: A bench verdict "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."
State v. Walker, 143 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). When

reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, the court must sustain the trial
court's judgment unless it is "against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id.
at 193.
Preservation: The issue on appeal was not preserved in the record below. This Court has
created an exception to the preservation rule where, in the context of a criminal bench
trial, rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applied.
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury,
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made
in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, % 9 n. 4, 999 P.2d 1252 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.
52(b); see Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e) (stating rules of civil procedure govern in criminal
proceedings where no other statute or rule applies)). When reviewing a sufficiency of the
evidence claim, this Court will determine whether the conviction was "supported by a
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the
[factfinder] may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at ^f 10
(quotations and citation omitted). In finding Cloward guilty of aggravated exploitation of
prostitution, the District Court made findings and conclusions concerning each element of
that offense. Therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence claim is preserved.
Alternatively, this issue is raised under the plain error doctrine. The plain error
doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error occurred which prejudiced
2

the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a
highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was
before the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 & n.8 (Utah), cert,
denied, 493 U.S. 814(1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal. Their text is
provided in full in Addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1306 (2008). Aggravated exploitation of prostitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 (2008). Exploiting prostitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 7, 2008, Ms. Cloward was charged by information with one count of
Aggravated Exploitation of Prostitution, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1306 (2008). R. 1-3. A preliminary hearing was held on September 3,
2008. R. 51. At the hearing, the court found probable cause to believe that Ms. Cloward
had committed the offense charged and she was bound over for trial. Id. Cloward was
convicted following a bench trial held on March 19, 2009. R. 82. On May 18, 2009, the
district court sentenced Cloward to a term of 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. R.
63-4. Private counsel was allowed to withdraw and the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association was thereafter appointed to represent Cloward on her appeal. R. 78-80.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wood, the person that Cloward allegedly purposely caused to become or remain a
prostitute, first came to work for Cloward as an escort in January of 2008 when she
learned of the Cloward's business and initiated contact with her. R. 82:9, 117-8. Wood
testified that she had heard about Cloward from a friend and "was taken over there at her
house to meet her." R. 82:9. According to Cloward, she was introduced to Wood through
a mutual friend, Gabby, who told Cloward that she had met Wood at a club and that
Wood wanted to work, presumably as an escort. R. 82:117. Cloward testified that when
Gabby brought Wood over to her house for the first time, Wood claimed to have
experience working as escort. R. 82:118.
According to Wood's testimony, at that first meeting, she and Cloward discussed
escorting in general, escort fees, and tips for services that could be performed. R. 82:101. Specifically, Wood claimed that they discussed how tips could be earned for services
such as massages, shower shows, dancing, and sex acts. R. 82:11-2. Wood claimed that
Cloward told her that she could to do whatever she felt comfortable with. R. 82:11-2.
Wood further alleged that Cloward "never said nothing about don't have sex, like, that's
up to you if to have sex or do oral or anything like that." R. 82:13. Cloward testified that
at that first meeting, she told Wood, "never, ever have sex. Never do oral sex, never do
anything like that." R. 82:119.
Wood worked for Cloward as an escort for two to three months. R. 82:17. For
each call that she went on, Wood said that she collected a "service fee" of $135, and that
4

Cloward received $70 of that service fee. R. 82:10. When asked what the "service fee"
was for, Wood explained that the purpose of the "service fee" was "[t]o go there. Like
when clients would call you'd go there, and then you - right when you get there you're
supposed to collect money for going and showing up." Id. Beyond the service fee, Wood
said that she also gave Cloward 10% of her tips. R. 82:14. Regarding how tips are earned
and priced, Wood said:
You set your own prices. Every girl sets their own prices. So, like, if I went
in and was, like, okay, I need $135, that's the agency fee. And so I am
expected to collect that first and have the client pay me that. And then I put
that in my pocket. And then we further discuss tips. So I'd be like, well like, I'd usually ask the client what they want to do tonight. And then, like,
maybe I'd offer a massage or something, and whatever price I wanted to
say, like, 300 for a massage, then - without a happy ending, or whatever.
Then we'd discuss that. And then whether he wanted to do it or not. Then
he'd he give me the money or he wouldn't.
R. 82:13-4.
While employed by Cloward, Wood went on several calls and received tips for
services including: one performance at a bachelor party, massages, dances, two shower
shows, and performed an act of prostitution only once during that period. R. 82:67-9.
She testified that she performed a "happy ending," an act that involves masturbation, one
time. R. 82:69.
Cloward testified that when Wood first came to her looking for work, she told
Wood that she had to be eighteen to work as an escort. R. 82:123. She said that Wood
told her that she was 23 years old and gave her an ID to prove it. R. 82:124. Defense
Exhibit 1. Cloward said that she believed Wood when she said that she was over 18, not
5

only because she presented her with identification, but also because Gabby told her that
Wood was 23 years old and because Gabby had told Cloward that she had met her at the
Vortex club. R. 82:125-6. According to Wood, she told Cloward that she was 18 years
old and Cloward believed that she was eighteen years old. R. 82:35, 66. Wood said that
she knew that she had to be 18 years old to work at an escort agency and she was afraid
that she would be fired if Cloward found out that she was not eighteen. R. 82:61-2.
Wood also admitted to going to a bar with Cloward. R. 82:147. Wood was actually 16
years old. R. 82:17.
On February 28, 2008, Layton City Police conducted an undercover prostitution
sting at a local hotel. R. 82:101. The officers called a phone number they found in a
classified ad advertising escort services in a City Weekly newspaper. R. 82:101; State's
Exhibit 2. Cloward had the placed the ad in the City Weekly advertising her escort
service. R. 82:104. In response to the call from the officers, Wood arrived at the hotel. In
regard to the conversation that took place with the undercover officer when she arrived,
Wood testified, "he kept trying to push me for sex. And I was like, no, I'm not a fullservice pe - I'm not a full-service girl. I don't do sex or anything. And he just kept
trying to push me. I think that we agreed to a massage and a hand job." R. 82:19. Wood
was subsequently arrested for solicitation of prostitution. Id.
Wood testified that while she was in the process of being arrested, Cloward called
to check in on her. Id. At the direction of the police officers, Wood did not inform
Cloward that she was being arrested. Id. However, according to Wood, Cloward could
6

tell by Wood's voice on the phone that "something was wrong." R. 82:27. So as not to
let on to Cloward that she was being arrested, Wood testified that, "I just made up the
first thing that came to my head. I was like he's just kind of being aggressive. He wants
to have sex." Id. Wood further explained,
So I was talking to [Cloward] and I was like I just don't know. I was like
he's kind of aggressive and stuff. And she was like, well, if he was going
to try to do anything just get out of there. And I was like, well, I don't
know, I think I'm going to try to stick around to get some money because
he has - he has kind of a lot of money on him. And she was like, well, just
be careful. And she was like, if anything, just don't stay if you don't feel
comfortable.
R. 82:26.
Initially, Wood said that someone named "Gabby" sent her on the call that night.
R. 82:30. Wood later changed her story and identified Cloward as the person that asked
her to go on the call the night of her arrest. Id. She explained that the call was intended
for Gabby, who was supposed to be working that night, but claimed that she was actually
sent on the call by Cloward. She said, "[Cloward's] the one that's like do you want to do
it? So I said yeah." R. 82:31. At trial, the defense attorney asked Wood, "You were
asked by the policeman who persuaded you to go up to Layton, Gabby or [Cloward].
And you said that it was Gabby, not [Cloward], right?" R. 82:55. To which she replied,
"Right. [Cloward] never persuaded me. She asked me straight up, do you want to go.
And I said okay." Id.

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
To prove that Cloward was guilty of aggravated exploitation of prostitution the
State had to show that she purposely persuaded, encouraged, or induced Wood, a person
under the age of 18 years old, to become or remain a prostitute.
The marshaled evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that
Cloward persuaded, encouraged, induced, or otherwise purposely caused Wood to
become or remain a prostitute. To the contrary, all of the evidence presented showed only
that Wood's decision to engage in prostitution was her own. Wood, the State's primary
witness, never claimed that Cloward persuaded, encouraged, or even asked her to engage
in prostitution. Rather, throughout the whole of the State's case, Wood maintained that
she was the one who decided what services to offer to clients and how much to charge.
Further, the State failed to prove that Cloward was aware that Wood was underage. In
fact, the only evidence presented by the State on this issue established that Cloward
believed that Wood was at least 18 years old. No evidence was presented from which a
person could base a conclusion that Cloward was aware that Wood was underage.
Therefore, the trial court's finding that Cloward was guilty of aggravated exploitation of
prostitution is clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
In reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, this Court "must sustain the
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
8

made." Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 at f 10 (quotations and citation omitted). This standard
accords "appropriate recognition of the relative deference owed multi-member panels as
opposed to single-judge findings." State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1988).
"Under this less deferential standard, the likelihood that a defendant's conviction will be
reversed following a bench trial, as opposed to a jury trial, is increased." Id. In order to
sustain a conviction "it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each
element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 at f 10 (quotations and
citation omitted).
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant "must marshal all
of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to
support the findings against an attack." Id. at \ 11. (citation omitted). Proper marshaling
requires the appellant to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant
resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991)(emphasis in original). "After constructing this magnificent array of supporting
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id.
Accordingly, the marshaled evidence is as follows:

9

1. Cloward operated an escort service and placed an ad in the City Weekly
advertising her escort service. R. 82:116. Escort services1 and the advertising
thereof are not illegal.
2. Although she initially claimed someone named "Gabby" sent her on the call, at
trial Wood alleged that Cloward sent her on the call the night of her arrest. R.
82:18. Again, operating an escort service is not illegal.
3. Wood attempted to prostitute herself to an undercover officer. R. 82:19. When
asked directly whether Cloward told her to have sex the night of her arrest, Wood
said, "Nope." R. 82:39. Wood further testified that, on a phone call the night of
her arrest, when she told Cloward that the client was being aggressive and wanted
sex, Cloward told her to leave. R. 82:26
4. When Cloward called Wood while she was in the process of being arrested,
Cloward asked Wood if it was a "sting." R. 82:27. Cloward was concerned that it
was "sting" because she was operating the escort service without a license. R.
82:116.
5. Wood alleged that Cloward recommended that she take condoms when she went
on calls. R. 82:17. Cloward testified that she neither discussed condoms with
Wood, nor gave her condoms. R. 82:128.
An escort service is "any person who furnishes or arranges for an escort to accompany
another individual for: (a) companionship; and [for:] (b)(i) a salary; (ii) a fee; (iii) a
commission; (iv) hire; (v) profit; or (vi) any amount similar to an amount listed in this
Subsection 2(b)." Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102(2) (2009). An escort is "any individual
who is available to the public for the purpose of accompanying another individual" for
compensated companionship. Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102(1) (2009).
10

6. Wood claimed that she gave Cloward 10% of the tips that she earned while
working as an escort. R. 82:14. Wood testified that tips could be performed for
any number of services that do not constitute prostitution. R. 82:11-3. Although
Wood went on numerous of calls during the months that she worked as an escort
for Cloward, she performed an act of prostitution only one time. R. 82:69.
7. Wood was 16 years old at the time of her arrest. R. 82:17. Wood testified that she
told Cloward that she was eighteen years old. R. 82:66. She also testified that she
believed that Cloward thought that she was eighteen years old. R. 82:35. Wood
further testified that she was afraid that she would be fired if Cloward found out
that she was underage. R. 82:62. Wood also admitted that she went to a bar with
Cloward. R. 82:147. Cloward testified that Wood told her that she was 23 years
old and gave her an ID to prove it. R. 82:124. Defense Exhibit 1. Cloward said
that she believed Wood when she said that she was over 18, not only because she
presented her with identification, but also because Gabby told her that Wood was
23 years old and because Gabby had told Cloward that she had met her at the
Vortex club. R. 82:125-6.
POINT. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE MARSHALED
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT CLOWARD PURPOSELY CAUSED A PERSON UNDER THE
AGE OF 18 TO BECOME OR REMAIN A PROSTITUTE
A conviction "must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each
element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Andreason, 2001 UT App 395,^j 4, 39 P.3d 982
11

(quotations and citation omitted). Here, in order to sustain a conviction for Aggravated
Exploitation of Prostitution, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
element of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1306.
As applied to the facts of the present case, that section provides, in pertinent part,
that a person is guilty of aggravated exploitation if "in committing an act of exploiting
prostitution, as defined in Section 76-10-1305," the person "persuaded ... is under 18
years of age." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1306. Pursuant to the underlying statute, Section
76-10-1305, a person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he "encourages, induces, or
otherwise purposely causes another to become or remain a prostitute." Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1305. Therefore, in order to sustain a conviction for aggravated exploitation of
prostitution, the State must prove that the defendant committed an act of exploiting
prostitution as defined in Section 76-10-1305 and that the person persuaded was under 18
years of age. Therefore, the State must show that: (1) the defendant encouraged,
induced, or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute, and (2)
the person persuaded was under 18 years of age. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1306; Utah
Code Ann. §76-10-1305.

For the sake of clarity and readability, the term "persuade" from Section 76-10-1306
and the phrase "encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes" from Section 76-101305 are used interchangeably herein. Section 76- 10-1306 states, in relevant part, "in
committing an act of exploiting prostitution, as defined in Section 76-10-1305," the
person "persuaded ... is under 18 years of age." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-1306. However,
the referenced statute, Section 76-10-1305, does not contain the term "persuade." Rather,
Section 76-10-1305 uses the analogous phrase "encourages, induces, or otherwise
purposely causes." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-1305. A reading of the two statutes in
conjunction reveals only one possible conclusion, that the authors meant for the word
12

A. The State Failed to Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt That Cloward
Persuaded, Encouraged, Induced, or Otherwise Purposely Caused Wood to
Become or Remain a Prostitute
It is well-established that criminal offenses require the joint operation of act and
intent, and that absent proof of mens rea with regard to each element of an offense, there
is normally no crime proved, unless the offense at issue involves well-defined strict
liability. See, e.g., State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984). Here, Section 76-101306 does not explicitly state a required mens rea. However, the offense of aggravated
exploitation of prostitution is not one of strict liability. The Supreme Court has made it
clear that the "mere omission from [a criminal statute] of any mention of intent will not
be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced." Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). Section 76-2-102 states, "An offense shall
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative
purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by
the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state." Utah Code Ann. § 762-102 (2008) (emphasis added). No such legislative purpose is indicated in Section 7610-1306 or Section 76-10-1305.
Pursuant to Section 76-2-102, "when the definition of the offense does not specify
a culpable mental state" and the crime is not one of strict liability, a crime requires a
mental state of at least recklessness. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102. Under the heading
"Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal responsibility," Section 76-2-101 states,
"persuade" and the phrase "encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes" to be
somewhat interchangeable.
13

"A person is not guilty of an offense unless the person's conduct is prohibited by law; and
the person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a
mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the definition of the
offense requires." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1 )(a)-(b)(i) (2008).
Here, Section 76-10-1306 provides minimal assistance in determining what
standard of intent is appropriate as it simply states, in relevant part, "A person is guilty of
aggravated exploitation if in committing an act of exploiting prostitution, as defined in
Section 76-10-1305, the person persuaded . . . is under 18 years of age." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1306. However, the underlying statute, Section 76-10-1305 Exploiting
Prostitution, states, in relevant part, "A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he ...
encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or remain a
prostitute." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 (emphasis added). While "purposely" is not
one of the four standard mens rea under Utah law, it is "a mental state otherwise specified
in the statute defining the offense " pursuant to Section 76-2-101. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-101.
The Model Penal Code is helpful in determining a specific meaning of
"purposely" in the context of criminal culpability, as the Supreme Court has consistently
looked to the Model Penal Code as an avenue of resolving questions of this nature. See
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978) (concluding that the Model Penal Code is a source of
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guidance in determining the appropriate level of mens rea and adopting "knowledge" as
such level). Section 2.02(2)(a) of the Model Penal Code defines "purposely" as follows:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause such a result; and(ii) if the element involves the attendant
circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he
believes or hopes that they exist.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (2008).
Thus, in terms of the four standard mens rea of Utah law, "purposely" corresponds
best to the mens rea of "intentionally3" or, at least, "knowlingly4" based on the language
of the statute and the definition of "purposely." Furthermore, "purposely" is a more
appropriate mens rea than the default mens rea of "recklessness," not only because it is
explicitly contained in the definition of the underlying statute, but also because
"purposely" comports to the statue on the whole and to the relevant case law.
As applied to facts of the present case, the relevant terms of the applicable statutes
are the word "persuaded" from Section 76-10-1306 and the phrase "encourages, induces,
or otherwise purposely causes" from Section 76-10-1305. "Persuade" is defined as: "to
induce to undertake a course of action or embrace a point of view by means of argument,
A person engages in conduct "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to
the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)
(2008).
4
A person engages in conduct "[k]nowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (2008).
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reasoning, or entreaty." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4
ed. 2010). Implicit in this definition is that persuasion is achieved by an overt or
volitional act undertaken by the persuader to stimulate or foster the desired response.
"Encourage" is defined as: "to instigate; to incite to action; to embolden; to help." Black's
Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Thus, the act of "encouraging" a person to do something
is inherently deliberate and contemplates a conscious purpose. Therefore, applying a
mens rea of recklessness would be incongruous with the meaning of the language of the
statute. Statutory provisions should be construed to "give full effect to all their terms."

Of course, it is clear from the plain language of the statute, that the author of
Section 76-10-1305 similarly understood that the act "to encourage" or "to induce" a
person to do something requires that the act be "purposely caused" by the actor. The
statute states: "A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he .. . encourages, induces,
or otherwise purposely causes another to become or remain a prostitute . . ." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1305. In contrast, a person engages in conduct "recklessly with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of
but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist
or the result will occur." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. "Recklessness" simply does not
rise to the level of intent required by the statute.
"Furthermore, a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation" dictates "that a
statute 'be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought
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to be accomplished.' " State v. Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah App.1995) (quoting
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977)). A statutory
interpretation in which the requisite intent for the offense of exploiting prostitution
defaults to "recklessly" would vitiate the meaning of the statute. The phrase "encourages,
induces, or otherwise purposely causes" in the statute would cease to have its intended
meaning. Not only is it contrary to reason, it is simply not possible for a person to
"recklessly purposely" cause another to be become a prostitute. Statutes should also be
construed to avoid absurd results. State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) ("It
is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that
the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.").
While the word "intent" does not appear in the statute, a specific intent5, if not
inherent in the words, "encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to

5

In declining to abandon the use of the term "specific intent," the court in State v.
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), held that:
We are aware that the Model Penal Code has abandoned use of the terms
"specific intent" and "general intent." See Model Penal Code § 2.02
comment 1, at 230-32 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985); W.
LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 28, at 202 (1972). We
also recognize that the terms "general intent" and "specific intent" have not
been altogether free of difficulty in the criminal law. But we do not believe
that total abandonment of the terms will serve to clarify this vital corner of
the law. We believe, on the contrary, that the term "specific intent" has
utility in describing a culpable mental state, or mind set, that describes a
required purpose, knowledge, attitude, or motive, in addition to the mere
volitional act, such as pulling a trigger, which has no inherent moral value
but causes a killing.
Id at 260 n.3. {Citing State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 625 n. 3 (Utah 1987); State v.
Miller, 677 P.2d 1129, 1131-32 (Utah 1984); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 90 (Utah), cert.
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become or remain a prostitute" may certainly be implied from them. Here, the evidence
that was used at trial to convict Cloward of aggravated exploitation of prostitution was
the fact that she operated an escort service and she was person that sent Wood on the call
the night of Wood's arrest. However, operating an escort services is not illegal. Without
the requisite criminal intent, the act of sending an escort out on a call is an otherwise
legitimate act. Therefore, in order to criminalize this conduct, it must be shown that
Cloward did it with the specific intent that Wood engage in prostitution. In other words,
in order for this otherwise legal act to be criminal, it must be shown that the actor
committed the act with a bad or criminal purpose. Therefore, the State must be required
to prove that Cloward "purposely caused" Wood to engage in prostitution or had the
specific intent that her actions would cause Wood to engage in prostitution.
A determination that the State had to prove that Cloward only recklessly persuaded
Wood to become a prostitute to be guilty of exploiting prostitution, would likely
criminalize otherwise legal conduct.

If the court were to disregard the definition in the

underlying statute, and rely solely on the wording of Section 76-10-1306, the State would
be required to prove that Cloward recklessly6 persuaded Wood to become or remain a
prostitute. Under this unduly expansive interpretation of the statute, every person who
denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341, 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982); State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d
643, 646-47 (Utah 1982)).
6
Section 76-2-103(3) provides that a person acts recklessly when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. Utah Code
Ann. §76-2-103(3) (2008).
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operates an escort agency could arguably be guilty of exploiting prostitution. The
"recklessness" determination is whether the defendant was subjectively f,aware of but
consciously disregarded]" the risk her actions posed. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3)
(2008). As applied here, the determination is whether Cloward was subjectively aware of
but consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that, by employing Wood
as an escort, Wood would be persuaded to become or remain a prostitute. Under this
determination, and because an act of prostitution or attempted prostitution is not
necessary to the offense, anyone employing a person as an escort with the awareness that
the escort may be persuaded to commit prostitution is guilty of exploiting prostitution.
As this is surely not what the legislature intended, the State must be required to prove that
Cloward "purposely" caused Wood to engage in prostitution.
Further support of for a "purposely" mens rea is found in caselaw. In State v.
Woodall, the offense charged was that defendant "induced, persuaded, encouraged and
enticed" a woman to become a prostitute. State v. Woodall, 305 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah
1956). In reviewing the jury instructions given at trial the court found that the defendant
was not precluded from having a fair and proper determination of the issues where:
It should be observed that the court instructed the jury in the words of the
statutes that they must be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that
An act of prostitution is not a necessary component of the offense of exploiting
prostitution. See State v. Gates, 118 Utah 182 (In the statute defining panderer as any
person who procures, induces, "encourages", inveigles or entices female person to
become prostitute, the word 'encourages' as there used does not require that the female
accept the proposition. Id. at 880). "All that is necessary under the meaning of
['encourages'] is that the other person attempt or try to persuade her" to become or
remain a prostitute. Id. at 881.
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defendant 'had the intent to cause [the alleged prostitute] to become a
prostitute,' and 'That with such intent the defendant adopted and executed a
course of conduct, or spoke such words to [the alleged prostitute], or both,
as constituted either encouragement, enticement, persuasion or inducement
for her to become a prostitute.' He further instructed them that the words
and conduct must have had a reasonable tendency 'to cause [the alleged
prostitute] to become a prostitute.'
Woodall, 305 P.2d at 476-7 (emphasis added). The gravamen of the offense is the intent
to purposely cause prostitution.
Moreover, "longstanding principles of lenity, which demand resolution of
ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. . . preclude [the Court's]
resolution of the ambiguity against petitioner on the basis of general declarations of
policy in the statute and legislative history." Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422
(1990) (internal citation omitted). The rule of lenity, as ordinarily applied, reflects the
law's insistence that a criminal statute provide "fair warning .. . of what the law intends
to do if a certain line is passed." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (internal
quotations omitted).
Therefore, the State had to prove that Cloward purposely persuaded, encouraged,
or induced Wood to become or remain a prostitute. The State failed to do so. The facts
presented by the State do not comprise "a quantum of evidence concerning [the intent to
purposely cause prostitution] from which [a trial court] may base its conclusion of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 at If 10 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Therefore, Cloward's conviction for aggravated exploitation of
prostitution cannot be sustained.
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Again, to be guilty of aggravated exploitation of prostitution, the State must
initially establish that Cloward is guilty of the underlying exploiting prostitution statute,
which requires that the State prove that Cloward encouraged, induced, or otherwise
purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-101306; Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305. The prosecution's evidence in this case was
insufficient to prove that Cloward purposely persuaded Wood to become or remain a
prostitute.
The facts presented at trial establishes that, from the outset, Wood's actions and
decisions that led to her arrest for solicitation of prostitution were solely her own. She
initiated contact with Cloward for the purpose of working for her as an escort. R. 82:9,
117. She was the one who decided what services to offer and how much to charge. R.
82:13-4. She admitted lying to Cloward about her age so that she wouldn't be fired. R.
82:61-2. There is simply no evidence in the record that Cloward ever persuaded Wood to
become or remain a prostitute. When asked directly whether Cloward told her to have
sex the night of her arrest, Wood said, "Nope." R. 82:39.
First, Cloward did not encourage, persuade or even ask Wood to come work for
her as an escort. It was the other way around. Wood is one who sought out Cloward.
Cloward testified that she was introduced to Wood through a mutual friend, Gabby, who
met Wood at a dance club and told Cloward that "she had a cute friend that wanted to
work." R. 82:117. Gabby also worked for Cloward as an escort. R. 82:117. Wood,
herself, admitted, "I heard about [Cloward] through a friend. And I was taken over there
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to her house to meet her." R. 82:9. Wood instigated that first meeting with Cloward for
the purpose of working for her as an escort. Being that Wood had "heard of Cloward"
through a friend, it is unlikely that, at the time of their first meeting, Wood was
completely ignorant to the general idea of escort services.
Cloward testified that at their first meeting, she told Wood, "never, ever have sex.
Never do oral sex, never do anything like that." R. 82:119. Wood claimed that at that first
meeting, she and Cloward discussed escorting in general, fees to charge, and tips for
services that could be performed. R. 82:10-1. Specifically, she alleged that they discussed
that tips could be earned for services such as massages, dancing, or showers, none of
o

which legally constitute sexual activity in the context of prostitution. R. 82:10-1.
Wood further alleged that massages performed for tips may or may not involve
acts of masturbation. R. 82:12. Cloward did not direct Wood to perform sexual activity
and instead told her to do "what felt comfortable." R. 82:11. Because Wood was given
general guidance to "do anything [she] wanted" and "whatever [she felt] comfortable
with," Cloward did not encourage, induce, or persuade her to perform sexual activity. R.
82:11. Moreover, Wood testified that any decision to have sex while on a call was her
own. R. 82:13-4. Although she alleged that Cloward "never said nothing about don't
have sex," she also indicated that Cloward said, "that's up to you if you want to have sex
or do oral or anything like that." R. 82:13. Even if Cloward made this statement, which
Sexual activity is statutorily defined as "acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any
sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person,
regardless of the sex of either participant." Utah Ann. Code § 76-10-1301(4) (2008).
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she denied (R. 82:119), the statement does not rise to the level of persuasion,
encouragement or inducement. Instead, it clarified to Wood that sexual activity was not
part of her job as an escort.
Wood's testimony regarding fees charged for services further demonstrates that
Cloward did not encourage, induce or persuade her to engage in prostitution. Instead, the
testimony makes it clear that Wood would decide prices other than the $135 agency fee:
You set your own prices. Every girl sets their own prices. So, like, if I went
in and was, like, okay, I need $135, that's the agency fee. And so I am
expected to collect that first and have the client pay me that. And then I put
that in my pocket. And then we further discuss tips. So I'd be like, well like, I'd usually ask the client what they want to do tonight. And then, like,
maybe I'd offer a massage or something, and whatever price I wanted to
say, like, 300 for a massage, then - without a happy ending, or whatever.
Then we'd discuss that. And then whether he wanted to do it or not. Then
he'd he give me the money or he wouldn't.
R. 82:13-4. Again, Wood was in control of what she chose to do and how much to
charge. Wood's claim that Cloward passively allowed her to make her own decisions
about what to offer and how much to charge does not rise to the level of encouragement,
inducement, or purposely causing required by the statute.
Wood also testified that she collected a "service fee" of $135 for each call she
went on, and that Cloward received $70 of that service fee. R. 82:10. When asked what
the "service fee" was for, Wood explained that the purpose of the "service fee" was "[t]o
go there. Like when clients would call you'd go there, and then you - right when you get
there you're supposed to collect money for going and showing up." Id. Thus, according
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to State's primary witness, the $135 service fee of which Cloward received $70 was
simply for going on the call and did not involve any act of sex or prostitution.
In addition to a portion of the service fee, Wood said that she gave Cloward ten
percent of her tips, "Like, so if I made a hundred dollar tip then I'd give her $10." R.
82:14. As established by Wood's testimony, a tip could be earned for a multitude of
services that did not involve acts of prostitution (dancing, massages, showers, etc.), and
Wood made the decision whether or not to offer additional services and what to charge
for services that she did offer. R. 82:11-2. Thus, Wood alleged that, for each call she
went on, Cloward would receive $70 from the service fee and then an additional ten
percent of any tip earned. This does not establish that Cloward persuaded Wood to
engage in prostitution. The ten percent that Cloward received was relatively small in
comparision to the $70 service fee, and tips could be earned for any number of services
that did not involve prostitution. In fact, Wood testified that, although she went on
numerous calls while employed by Cloward and shared ten percent of the tips she
received with Cloward, she performed an act of prostitution only once during that period.
R.82:15,69.
The fact that Wood went on many calls during the time that she worked for
Cloward but engaged in sexual activity only once further demonstrates that Cloward did
not encourage, induce, or persuade her to be a prostitute. Wood worked for Cloward for
two to three months. R. 82:17. When asked if she had done several calls during that time,
she replied, "Yeah, a lot. I was on call like 24/7. I'd be asleep and my phone would ring
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and, like, 1:00 in the morning, or I'd be out dancing and I'd have a call and have to leave
and go." R. 82:67. If Wood was on call "24/7" for a period of two to three months and
went on "a lot" of calls, she could have completed several dozen calls during that period.
But, on the several dozens of calls that she went on, Wood performed only one act
of prostitution. R. 82:69. She testified that during that time, "I did like two shower
shows. And most of the time it was just dancing." R. 82:68. When asked to elaborate,
Wood said,
Well, usually, like, when you were just with a client, like, you just did, like,
a striptease in your lingerie to a song, and then, like, like, act like you were
going to give them a lap dance but just tease them.
R. 82:68. Showers and dancing, even nude dancing, do not constitute sexual activity in
the context of prostitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4). Wood also described a
"trick" that she once performed at bachelor party that involved removing money from a
person's nose with her genital area. R. 82:69. However, the "trick" that Wood described
does not meet the statutory definition of sexual activity in the context of prostitution
because it did not involve "the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person" as proscribed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4). On the several dozen calls
that she went on as an escort, the only act that she performed that legally constituted
prostitution was one time when she performed a "happy ending" during a massage, an act
which involves masturbation. R. 82:69; See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4).
The evidence that Wood performed only one act of prostitution on several dozens
calls further demonstrates that Cloward did not encourage, induce or persuade her to
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engage in prostitution. Cloward would not have sent her on so many calls if she were
unhappy with Wood's work as an escort. And, if Cloward had actually wanted Wood to
engage in prostitution or if she were not satisfied with Wood's tips, she would have at
least mentioned it to her once during those months that she worked for her. Yet, the
prosecution presented no evidence that Cloward ever affirmatively told Wood, or even
suggested, that she perform an act of prostitution. The State presented no evidence that
Cloward implied that she should engage in prostitution or that "it was a good idea" for
Wood to engage in prostitution. The State presented no evidence that Cloward ever told
Wood that she need to make more money or that she needed to work harder. The State
presented no evidence that Cloward ever tried to coax Wood into engaging in prostitution
or that she ever even jokingly implied that Wood should engage in prostitution. There
was simply no evidence presented that Cloward either explicitly or impliedly tried to
persuade Wood into prostitution. The strongest testimony that the State presented in this
regard was that Cloward did not tell Wood not to have sex on the calls. A person is not
guilty of exploiting prostitution for failing to tell someone not to prostitute themselves.
Wood's testimony that she would not have engaged in sexual activity the night of
the crime but for the pressure from the undercover officer further demonstrates that
Cloward did not induce or persuade her to engage in prostitution. The night that Wood
was arrested for prostitution, she did not want to go through with the prostitution. R.
82:38. Gabby told her that she could just leave with the money or just give a massage.
R. 82:55. At trial, Wood was asked, "Is it still your testimony today that you had no
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intent to commit sex, you were just going to take the money and leave?" R. 82:38. She
replied that "well, there for a while that was my - that's what I started doing, just taking
the money and making some excuse. So yeah, that's what I planned on doing because I
didn't want to do any sexual act." Id. She further explained that "the officer was pretty
aggressive of what he wanted, so I didn't think there was a way I could get out of there
unless I made up some excuse to where he would let me go. But obviously not because it
was a sting operation." R. 82:38-9. Thus, Wood would not have committed the crime of
prostitution but for the pressure from the undercover officer. There was no pressure from
Cloward to do it. Because Wood did not claim that Cloward persuaded her to prostitute
herself that night, but rather, that she would not have prostituted herself, except for the
fact that the undercover office was being aggressive and she thought that he would not let
her go, the State failed to establish that Cloward persuaded Wood to engage in
prostitution.
Indeed, the night of her arrest, Cloward told Wood to leave. R. 82:26. Wood
testified that while she was in the process of being arrested, Cloward called to check in
on her. Id. At the direction of the police officers, Wood did not inform Cloward that she
was being arrested. Id. However, according to Wood, Cloward could tell by Wood's
voice on the phone that "something was wrong." R. 82:27. So as not to let on to
Cloward that she was being arrested, Wood testified that, "I just made up the first thing
that came to my head. I was like he's just kind of being aggressive. He wants to have
sex."7tf. Wood said,
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So I was talking to [Cloward] and I was like I just don't know. I was like
he's kind of aggressive and stuff. And she was like, well, if he was going
to try to do anythingy'w.yf get out of there. And I was like, well, I don't
know, I think I'm going to try to stick around to get some money because
he has - he has kind of a lot of money on him. And she was like, well, just
be careful. And she was like, if anything, just don't stay if you don 'tfeel
comfortable.
R. 82:26 (emphasis added).
First, Wood testified that Cloward could tell by her voice on the phone that
something was wrong. So she made up a lie to explain the distress in her voice and mask
the fact that she was being arrested. The lie that Wood made up to explain her distress
was that "he wanted sex" and he was "kind of aggressive." R. 82:27. This demonstrates
that, in Wood's mind, having sex on a call was not normal and a client who is being
aggressive about wanting sex is distressful. If Cloward were persuading Wood to engage
in prostitution, this would not have been the lie that Wood created to mask the distress in
her voice because it would not have worked. In telling this lie to Cloward, Wood
obviously thought that Cloward would believe that she was, indeed, distressed at the
thought of a client trying to pressure her to have sex. But had Cloward actually persuaded
Wood to commit prostitution that night, Wood would not have expected her believe that
she was distressed at the idea of having sex with a client. Had that been the case, Wood
might have expected Cloward to react angrily at the proposition that she was not
submitting to having to sex with a client, especially a client with "a lot of money," or
otherwise encourage her to continue with the date.
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Next, Cloward told Wood to leave. Cloward did not try to persuade her to stay and
have sex with the client, she told her to "just get out of there." R. 82:26. Even when
Wood told her that he had a lot of money, Cloward told her "don't stay if you don't feel
comfortable." Id. This does not constitute persuading, encouraging, or inducing another
to become or remain a prostitute. To the contrary, it is discouraging prostitution. Given
these facts as presented by the prosecution, a reasonable person could not conclude that
Cloward persuaded Wood to engage in prostitution the night of her arrest. Wood's
decision to engage in prostitution was solely her own.
Wood's testimony that Cloward suggested that she take condoms on calls fails to
establish that Cloward persuaded Wood to engage in prostitution because recommending
condoms does not constitute encouragement, inducement or persuasion to become a
prostitute. Although Cloward testified that she neither discussed condoms with Wood
nor gave her condoms, Wood alleged that Cloward recommended that she take condoms
when she went on calls. R. 82:17, 128. In State v. Topharn, 123 P. 888 (Utah 1912), this
court set aside a conviction for pandering9 because the information upon which it was
based was fatally defective. However, in the course of its opinion this court reviewed the
evidence and indicated it might not have been sufficient to sustain a conviction, stating,
"[i]t is not enough that the defendant made some kind of a promise to the inmate; it must

9

The statute under which the defendant in Topham was charged stated: "Any person
who shall, by promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, cause, induce,
persuade, encourage, inveigle, or entice an inmate of a house of prostitution or place of
assignation to remain therein as such inmate," is guilty of the crime of pandering.
Topham, 123 P. at 889.
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also appear that the promise was made with the design or purpose of causing or inducing
the inmate to remain in the alleged house of prostitution, and that it was one fairly
calculated or naturally tending to produce such a result." Id. at 896. Similarly, a
recommendation to carry a condom cannot be considered an act fairly calculated or
naturally tending to produce the result of persuading or inducing a person to prostitute
themselves.
At best, the suggestion to carry condoms demonstrates that Cloward may have
been aware of the possibility that Wood could have sex on a call and wanted her to
practice safe-sex. But even if Cloward was aware that Wood may choose to have sex, a
submissive awareness of the fact does not suffice to prove that she purposely persuaded
Wood to commit prostitution. The State must show more than conduct evincing a
permissive disposition toward prostitution to show exploitation of prostitution. The
Supreme Court stated that, the "fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the
gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt." State v. Petree, 659
P.2d 443, 444-45 (Utah 1983), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Walker,
743 P.2d 191. And in reviewing the evidence, "the reviewing court will stretch the
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can take a
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence,
stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 445. Even if the evidence showed that Cloward was aware of
the possibility that Wood may engage in sex, it was manifestly insufficient to prove she
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purposely persuaded Wood to engage in prostitution as is required to sustain a conviction
for aggravated exploitation of prostitution.
The weight of the evidence was insufficient to support a reasonable belief that
Cloward purposely persuaded, encouraged, or induced Wood to become or remain a
prostitute. The State's evidence is void of any act or conduct on the part of Cloward
which shows that she persuaded, encouraged, induced, or otherwise purposely caused
Wood to become or remain a prostitute. In fact, according to Wood's testimony, it was
exclusively her own decision as to what services to offer to clients, and how much to
charge for the service she decided to offer. R. 82:13-4. The Utah Supreme Court stated
that "criminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before
we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning
each element of the crime as charged." State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980).
Therefore, Cloward5 s conviction cannot be sustained.
B. The State Failed to Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt That Cloward Was
Aware That Wood Was Underage
Pursuant to Section 76-10-1306, a person is guilty of aggravated exploitation of
prostitution if the person persuaded is under 18 years of age. See Utah Code Ann. §7610-1306(l)(b). Further, Section 76-2-304(1) states, "Unless otherwise provided,
ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any
prosecution for that crime." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304(1) (2008). Here, the State was
required to prove that Cloward was aware of Wood's underage status. Additionally,
Section 76-2-304.5 "Mistake as to victim's age not a defense," does not identify
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aggravated exploitation of prostitution as a crime to which the defense of mistake of age
is unavailable. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304.5 (2008). Again, Section 76-.10-1306 does
not explicitly state a required mens rea for the offense, but the underlying statute, Section
76-10-1305, contains the mens rea of "purposely." As established herein, a mens rea of
"purposely" is most consistent with "intentionally" or "knowingly," requiring the State to
prove that it was Cloward's conscious objective to cause a person less than 18 years of
age to engage in prostitution or, at least, that she did so knowingly.
However, if the Court chooses not to recognize the mens rea in the underlying
statute, "when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state and
the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall
suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102. "Liability for
criminal recklessness, knowledge, and intent require actual knowledge or awareness and
thus turns on the defendants subjective mental state." State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App
320, \\2 n.5, 14 P.3d 1.1. Therefore, in order to sustain Cloward's conviction for
aggravated exploitation of prostitution, her actual knowledge of Wood's age must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State failed to prove that Cloward was aware that Wood was underage since
both Cloward and Wood agreed that Cloward thought Wood was at least 18 years old.
Cloward testified that when Wood first came to her looking for work, she told Wood that
she had to be eighteen to work as an escort. R. 82:123. She said that Wood told her that
she was 23 years old and gave her an ID to prove it. R. 82:124. Defense Exhibit 1.
32

Cloward said that she believed Wood when she said that she was over 18, not only
because she presented her with identification, but also because Gabby told her that Wood
was 23 years old and because Gabby had met her at a dance club. R. 82:125-6.
Wood also testified that Cloward believed that Wood was eighteen years old. R.
82:35. She said that Cloward asked her for ID and if she was eighteen. R. 82:61. At trial,
Wood was asked, "You told the policeman that [Cloward] didn't know how old you are,
right?" R. 82:42. She replied, "She didn't." Id. The defense attorney then said, "and
you were asked how old does [Cloward] think you are, and you said 18." Id. She replied,
"Yep." Id. Wood further testified that she was afraid that she would be fired if Cloward
found out that she was not eighteen. R. 82:62.
Moreover, the testimony of both Wood and Cloward that Wood had frequented
clubs and at least one bar further shows that Cloward was not aware that Wood was
underage. Wood admitted that she and Cloward went to a bar, which only allows persons
21 years of age and older to enter. R. 82:147. Cloward said that she thought that Wood
was at least 18 years old because Gabby met her at the Vortex club. R. 82.T25-6. Wood
also testified, "I'd be out dancing and I'd have a call [to work as an escort] and I'd have
to leave and go." R. 82:67. The fact that Cloward called her to work while Wood was out
dancing, in conjunction with fact that most, if not all, dance clubs in Utah require patrons
to be at least 18 years of age, further establishes that Cloward believed that Wood was at
least 18 years old.
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Therefore, based on the evidence presented at trial, if the Court finds the defense
evidence to be credible, then Cloward believed that Wood was 23 years old, and, if the
Court finds the prosecution evidence to be credible, then, Cloward believed that Wood
was eighteen years old. There was no evidence presented that Wood appeared to be
under the age of 18, and nothing was presented that inferred that Cloward might have
assumed that she was under age. To the contrary, according to her own testimony, Wood
was allowed into bars and clubs and she told Cloward that she was 18 years old. R. 82:61,
67, 147.
The clear weight of the evidence standard requires that the clear weight of the
evidence, discounting questions of demeanor and credibility, presented at trial not be
contrary to the verdict. State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1988) (emphasis
added). Here, credibility and demeanor are not at issue on this point. The testimony
presented by both sides agree that Cloward believed Wood to be at least 18 years old, and
there was no evidence presented that Cloward was aware that Wood was underage. Here,
the weight of the evidence is certainly contrary to the verdict.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in some instances, it may be
"difficult" on appeal to dictate when an evidentiary defect should be apparent to a trial
court under the plain-error standard; however, at a certain point, "an evidentiary
insufficiency is so obvious and fundamental that it would be plain error for the trial court
not to discharge the defendant. An example is the case in which the State presents no
evidence to support an essential element of a criminal charge. The plain error exception
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would serve to avoid a manifest injustice in such a case.'1 State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
^[17, 10 P.3d 346 (emphasis in original). This is such a case. Based on a review of the
record, the insufficient evidence resulted in plain error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Cloward respectfully requests this Court reverse her
conviction for aggravated exploitation of prostitution.
SUBMITTED this

}6r

day of March, 2010.

SHERRY VAI
Attorney for Appellant
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Tab A

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1305 (2008)
§ 76-10-1305. Exploiting prostitution
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of prostitution for
one who would be an inmate;
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or remain a
prostitute;
(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that person's
engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for transportation with that purpose;
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shares the proceeds of prostitution
with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to share therein; or
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in association with
another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business.
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of the third degree.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1306 (2008)
§ 76-10-1306. Aggravated exploitation of prostitution
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated exploitation if:
(a) in committing an act of exploiting prostitution, as defined in Section 76-10-1305, he
uses any force, threat, or fear against any person; or
(b) the person procured, transported, or persuaded or with whom he shares the proceeds
of prostitution is under eighteen years of age or is the wife of the actor.
(2) Aggravated exploitation of prostitution is a felony of the second degree.

